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The decision to go public is one of the most important and least studied questions in corporate nance. Most corporate nance textbooks limit themselves to describing the institutional aspects of this decision, providing only a few remarks on its motivation. The conventional wisdom is that going public is simply a stage in the growth of a company. Although there is some truth in it, this \theory" alone cannot explain the observed pattern of listings. Even in developed capital markets, like the U.S., some large companies { such as United Parcel Service or Bechtel { are not public. 1 In other countries, like Germany and Italy, publicly traded companies are the exceptions rather than the rule, and quite a few private companies are much larger than the average publicly traded company. These cross-sectional and cross-country di erences indicate that going public is not a stage that all companies eventually reach, but is a choice. This begs the question of why some companies choose to use public equity markets and some don't.
This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of an initial public o ering (IPO) in Italy. The determinants of the decision to go public can be inferred both from the ex ante characteristics of the companies which go public and from the ex post consequences of this decision on a company's investment and nancial policy. In principle, if the relevant decision makers have rational expectations, the two methods should give consistent answers: the motives to go public uncovered on the basis of \ex ante evidence" should square with the \actual e ects" of otation. But in practice, rather than being redundant, ex post information is likely to complement the evidence based on the ex ante characteristics of the companies which go public, for two reasons. First, the importance of some variables can be assessed only by looking at ex post data: for example, the controlling shareholders' intention to divest after otation can hardly be gauged from ex ante information. Second, in some cases the e ects of the otation may not be fully anticipated, so that only ex post information can uncover them. Thus, we attack the issue of \why companies go public" by using both ex ante and ex post information on their characteristics and performance.
While the approach we devise is general, we chose to apply it to Italy, a country where few companies go public, for two reasons. The rst, and most important, is data availability. We have access to a unique data set that contains accounting information for a large sample of privately (and publicly) held rms, so that we observe companies which eventually go public many years 1 In 1992 UPS had $16.5 billion in sales and 267,000 employees. Bechtel group had $7.8 billion in sales and 31,000 employees. before they do so. We also have data on the cost of bank credit for each rm, so that we can check if the cost of bank credit a ects the choice to go public and, conversely, if going public a ects the terms subsequently o ered by banks. The availability of these data is important, considering that in most countries banks are the main source of external nance to companies.
The second reason is that Italy is probably the most egregious example of a developed economy with an underdeveloped equity market. Germany, France, and all the Continental European countries are fairly similar both in terms of size of equity market to GDP and in terms of numbers of IPOs per inhabitant (see La Porta et al, 1997) . Thus, understanding why few companies go public and many refrain from doing so in Italy can hopefully shed some light on the role of public equity markets in all these other countries as well.
We nd that the main factor a ecting the probability of an IPO is the market-to-book ratio at which rms in the same industry trade: a one-standard deviation increase in the market-to-book ratio raises the odds of an IPO by 25%. This positive relationship may re ect a higher investment need in sectors with high growth opportunities (and correspondingly high market-to-book ratios) or the entrepreneurs' attempt to time the market. Our nding that investment and pro tability decrease after the IPO points to the latter explanation.
The second most important determinant is the size of the company: larger companies are more likely to go public. IPOs also tend to involve companies that before the IPO grew faster and were more pro table. It is remarkable that the typical newly listed company is much larger and older in Italy than in the US. Since listing costs do not di er signi cantly between Italy and the US, this raises the question of why in Italy rms need such a long track record before going public. One possible explanation is that the lack of enforcement of minority property rights makes it more di cult for young and small companies to capture the investors' trust.
We also identify some di erences between the factors underlying the decision to list an independent company and a carve-out. The most striking is that size does not matter for the decision to list a subsidiary of a publicly traded company. Independent companies are also more likely to go public after major investments and abnormal growth, and after the IPO reduce their leverage and investment. So their decision to go public can be interpreted as an attempt to rebalance their balance sheet after large investments and growth. By contrast, the main force behind carve-outs appears to be the desire to maximize the proceeds from selling shares in a subsidiary, since these IPOs are particularly sensitive to a \window of opportunity".
Among the post-IPO e ects we nd a reduction in pro tability { a phenomenon consistent with ndings by various authors in the US (Degeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993; Jain and Kini, 1994 , and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah, 1995) . This e ect survives, albeit its magnitude is smaller, even if after controlling for the minimum pro tability condition that companies must satisfy to list on Italian stock exchanges. We also nd a reduction in investment and nancial leverage. All these e ects appear to persist beyond the rst three years after the IPO.
We also document { for the rst time, as far as we know { that after the IPO independent companies experience a reduction in the cost of bank credit. This e ect is present even controlling for rms' characteristics and for the reduction in leverage experienced after going public. Moreover, after the IPO these rms borrow from a larger number of banks and reduce the concentration of their borrowing. The reduced cost of credit may stem from the improved public information associated with stock exchange listing or from the stronger bargaining position vis{ a{vis banks determined by the availability of an outside source of funds.
We nd little evidence that portfolio diversi cation is important in the decision to go public. When an independent company undertakes an IPO the initial owners divest only 6 percent of the amount they hold in the company at that date and 1.3 percent more in the three subsequent years, retaining much more than a majority stake. Divestments are much larger (14.2 percent) for carve outs. Finally, we nd that in the three years after an IPO the turnover of the controlling group is larger than normal, which highlights the importance of looking at IPOs as a stage in the sale of a company, as suggested by Zingales (1995a) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data { a panel of 2,181 companies for the years 1982-92. Section 2 surveys the main theories of why companies go public, highlighting their testable implications. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of the decision to go public on the basis of the companies' ex ante characteristics and behavior. Section 4 reports the e ects of an IPO on pro tability, investment, nancial policies and the cost of bank credit. Section 5 studies the changes in ownership and control following an IPO. Finally, section 6 discusses the results obtained while comparing them with those obtained for other countries.
1 Data
Sources
We have three main sources of data. Balance sheet and income statement information come from the Centrale dei Bilanci database (Company Accounts Data Service). Information about interest rates, loan sizes and lines of credit is drawn from the Centrale dei Rischi database (Central Credit Register). Data about ownership and control are drawn from IPO prospectuses and from the Taccuino dell'azionista (Stock Exchange Companies Handbook). Occasionally (see below), additional balance sheet data are drawn from companies' annual reports. Since the rst two sources are quite novel, we provide some information on them below.
The Centrale dei Bilanci provides standardized data on the balance sheets and income statements of about 30,000 Italian non-nancial rms. The data have been collected since 1982 by a consortium of banks interested in pooling information about their clients. A rm is included in the sample if it borrows from at least one of the banks in the consortium. The database is highly representative of the Italian non-nancial sector: a recent report (Centrale dei Bilanci, 1992), based on a sample of 12,528 companies drawn from the database (including only the companies continuously present in 1982-90 and with sales in excess of 1 billion Lire in 1990), states that this sample covers 57 percent of the sales reported in national accounting data.
The Centrale dei Rischi is a department of the Bank of Italy in charge of collecting data on individual loans over 80 million Lire (US$ 52 K) granted by Italian banks to companies and individuals. These data are led compulsorily by banks and are made available upon request to individual banks to monitor the total exposure of their customers. In addition, 79 banks (accounting for over 70% of total bank lending) have agreed to le detailed information about the interest rates charged on each loan. These data, which are collected for monitoring purposes, are highly con dential.
The third source of our data is the IPO prospectuses prepared for companies that undertook a public o ering before being listed. The prospectuses are the only source that allows us to reconstruct the ownership structure of these companies before they went public. They are available for 62 of the 69 non-nancial companies listed on the MSE between 1982 and 1992 and present in our panel data set. Information about ownership structure and control after these companies went public was drawn from the publication (Taccuino dell'azionista).
Sample
The sample is drawn from the Centrale dei Bilanci. Since we want to study the determinants of the decision to go public, we restrict our attention to companies that have at least a minimal probability of going public during the 11 years of our sample .
A 1975 law made CONSOB (the Italian analogue of the SEC) responsible for establishing the listing requirements for Italian Stock Exchanges. But only in 1984 the CONSOB explicitly speci ed two requirements: (i) book value of shareholders' equity in excess of 10 billion Lire (US$ 6.5 M); (ii) positive earnings in the 3 years before listing. Both these criteria, though, could be waived with the CONSOB's consent, at least until 1989. In that year the CONSOB strengthened its requirements, mandating that pro tability measures be obtained irrespective of intra-group operations and extraordinary items. The new directive also dropped any mention of the possibility of waiving the shareholders' equity criterion, while the pro tability criterion could be waived only in the presence of major and permanent changes in a company's structure. In such cases, however, at least the last income statement should show positive earnings.
The changing regulatory environment and its exibility induced us to use a very mild criterion to extract our basic sample. We included all the companies that as of 1982 had at least Lire 5 billion in shareholder's equity (US$ 3.2 M). This criterion reduces the Centrale dei Bilanci sample to 2,181 companies. The sample contains 89% of the non-nancial companies which went public in the sample period. We apply this rst screening to eliminate a large number of small rms whose accounting data are typically quite unreliable. 2 In the empirical analysis, though, we will occasionally impose more restrictive criteria to test the robustness of our results to the selection bias induced by the listing eligibility requirements.
As Barca et al. (1994) have shown, most of Italian industry is organized around multi-company 2 We also considered an alternative criterion based on total assets. We preferred one based on shareholders' equity for two reasons. First, it is directly linked to one of the listing requirements. Second, it eliminates many large government-owned rms with negative shareholders' equity (for example ENEL, the Government-owned monopoly producer of electric power).
groups controlled by a single family via a holding company. This poses problems in establishing when a company can be considered as publicly traded: when the holding company is listed, all its subsidiaries might get some of the bene ts and bear some of the costs of being public. For instance, they can indirectly access the public equity market to nance investments, and they must bear the cost of certi ed auditing as part of the parent company's disclosure requirements. This does not preclude these companies from seeking to be separately listed (in such case we would have a spin-o or a carve-out), but their reasons for doing so may be di erent from those of an independent company. Therefore, we create a separate category to account for subsidiaries of public companies, and distinguish between the listing of independent companies and that of subsidiaries of publicly traded companies (which we collectively name carve-outs). 3 A second problem arises in identifying when a company can be considered publicly traded. Besides the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE), by far the most important one, until 1991 in Italy there were 9 other minor stock exchanges in di erent Italian cities, plus some informal markets, called \Mercati Ristretti". Since all of these other exchanges have very little volume and liquidity, we de ne as IPOs all the new listings in the Milan Stock Exchange. Alternatively, we could have de ned the date of new listing as the earliest date at which a company was listed in any of the above markets. 4 Since the sample obtained using the two de nitions do not di er much and all the results are substantially unchanged, we report only the results using the rst de nition.
There were 139 new listings on the MSE between 1982 and 1992. Of these, 25 concerned banks and insurance companies, which were excluded from the sample because of intrinsic di erences in the nature of their operations and accounting information. Of the remaining ones, 44 are classi ed as nancial companies by Indici e Dati, a stock market handbook, but 6 of these were so closely identi ed with one industrial subsidiary that we simply used the accounting data of the industrial subsidiary. 5 3 All new listings of subsidiaries of public companies except one are technically carve-outs. One case (Comau) is a spin-o . 4 During our sample period we are aware of only one company that started to be listed in a foreign market before being listed in Italy. This is Luxottica, which listed on the NYSE in 1990. 5 This is another problem created by the above-mentioned group structure. All the listed holding companies are, by de nition, nancial companies. In many cases this classi cation is misleading because some holding companies concentrate most of their assets in a single industrial company. For example, the Benetton family controls its industrial and commercial activities through Benetton Group SPA, a nancial holding company listed on the Milan Stock Exchange since 1986, but 95% of the group's consolidated sales are due to Benetton SPA, a textile subsidiary.
This leaves a total of 76 new non-nancial listings. Of these, we lose 3 observations because the company was incorporated after 1982 and another observation because the company did not satisfy the requirement of Lire 5 billion in shareholders' equity in 1982. Finally, we lose 5 companies because they were not reported in the Centrale dei Bilanci as of 1982. To these we add a company which went public by merging with a public company (Parmalat) and one which listed in New York instead of Milan (Luxottica). 6 So the nal sample contains 69 companies, of which 40 are new listings of independent companies, while 29 are carve-outs.
These IPOs are evenly distributed over the decade, but for a clustering in 1986 and 1987, when 45% of the listings took place. This clustering of IPOs is a well established phenomenon both in the US (Ritter, 1984) and other countries (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1993, and Ljungqvist, 1995) . Note that, unlike most stock exchanges, the MSE peaked in May 1986, so that the IPO \hot market" followed the stock market boom with a small time lag. Table 1 contains some summary statistics on our entire sample. The sample contains 19, 817 rm-years. The median rm in the sample has 51 billion Lire ($ 33 million) in sales, a return on assets of 11 percent, a debt to capital ratio of 38 percent, and capital expenditures of 21 percent of net property plant and equipment. Retained earnings represent the main source of nance for the median rm, which does not pay any dividend, increasing its capital by 9% a year. External equity plays no role, while external debt only adds 2 percent to capital every year. The number reported for market to book value is the median market to book value of equity for publicly traded companies in the same industry in each year. 7 Even though Benetton SPA de facto coincides with Benetton Group SPA, formally it is not a listed company. We overcome this problem by classifying Benetton Group as a textile company. Since the Centrale dei Bilanci only provides accounting data for industrial companies, we replace the missing data from the consolidated accounts of Benetton Group with the accounting data of its textile subsidiary. We follow this procedure only if a listed holding company owes more than 75% of its consolidated sales to a single subsidiary. This happens in 6 cases: Benetton Group, Boero Bartolomeo, Pininfarina, Raggio di Sole Finanziaria, SISA, Tripcovich. 6 In 1990 Parmalat merged into a listed nancial company (Finanziaria Centro Nord) and reorganized it completely under the name of Parmalat. We take this to be equivalent to a new listing. Luxottica went public on the New York Stock Exchange in 1990. We assume that the e ects of this choice are comparable to those of listing on the MSE. 7 Companies are divided in 23 industries according to the classi cation made by the Centrale dei Rischi. This roughly follows the SIC two digit classi cation.
Summary Statistics
In evaluating the determinants and the e ects of new listing one must take into account that every year only certain companies meet the listing requirements. Therefore, the appropriate benchmark against which the new listed rms are to be compared is not the entire sample, but the sample of rms that did not list despite meeting the listing requirements. As previously mentioned, the listing requirements changed during the sample period.
In Table 1 B we report the summary statistics for all the company-years that satisfy the listing requirements as of that year. Not surprisingly, the median company in the sample is larger (60 billion Lire in sales), more pro table (the median return on assets is 14 percent), less levered (the median ratio of debt to capital is 33 percent) and invests more (24 percent). The median company in our sample is about four times as large as the typical IPO in the US in terms of sales (Ritter, 1991) . Table 1 C reports the summary statistics of the new listed companies as of the year they went public. It is interesting to note that the median IPO is twice as large as the median potential IPO in terms of sales, employees and total assets. By contrast, the median IPO is not more pro table than the median potential IPO and is more highly levered.
Finally, Table 1 D reports some statistics on the age of new public companies and on the di erence between their age and that of similar companies which stayed private (matched by sector, and within the sector by size). 8 The average age of new public companies is 33 years for the companies which went public in 1982-92. These gures are roughly in line with the European average value of 40 years reported by Rydqvist and H ogholm (1995) , and much higher than the corresponding values for US new public companies: 5 years for venture-backed rms (Gompers, 1996) . Moreover, companies which go public appear to be signi cantly older than those which stay private: they were 10.4 years older in the 1980s. 9 8 Our data set do not contain the year of incorporation of a company. For this reason, we hand-collected the year of incorporation for the companies that did go public and for a sample of privately held rms matched by sector and size. 9 This gure is not speci c to the sample period investigated. To check this we collected the data for the age of companies which went public in the period 1968-81: the average IPO is even older (52.4 years), and signi cantly older than a matching company (+17 years).
Competing Theories
The decision to go public is so complex that no single model can hope to capture all of the relevant costs and bene ts. But almost all of the e ects of this decision have been evaluated in one model or another. Although these theories can hardly be nested in a single model, one can derive a set of (not mutually exclusive) testable predictions from them. In Table 2 and in the rest of this section we summarize the predictions of the main models.
2.1 The costs of going public 2.1.1 Adverse selection
In general investors are less informed than the issuers about the true value of the companies going public. This informational asymmetry adversely a ects the average quality of the companies seeking a new listing and thus the price at which their shares can be sold (Leland and Pyle, 1977) , and also determines the magnitude of the underpricing needed to sell them (Rock (1986) and many others).
This adverse selection cost is a more serious obstacle to the listing of young and small companies, which have little track record and visibility, than for old and large companies, as highlighted by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1995) . So in the presence of adverse selection, the probability of going public should be positively correlated with the age and/or the size of a company. Unfortunately, our data do not contain the date of incorporation, so that we shall only focus on company size, de ned as the logarithm of a company's sales (SIZE).
Administrative expenses and fees
Beside the initial underpricing, going public implies considerable direct costs: underwriting fees, registration fees, etc. On top of the initial expenses, there are the yearly layouts on auditing, certi cation and dissemination of accounting information, stock exchange fees, etc. Since many of these expenses do not increase proportionally with the size of the IPO, they weigh relatively more on small companies. Ritter (1987) has estimated that in the US the xed costs equal approximately $ 250,000 and the variable costs are about 7 percent of the gross proceeds of the IPO. In Italy the xed costs are about the same as in the US and the variable costs are 3.5 percent of the gross proceeds, so that the total direct costs of an IPO of comparable size are lower than in the US. 10 As for adverse selection, the existence of xed costs of listing suggests that the likelihood of an IPO should be positively correlated with company size.
Loss of con dentiality
The disclosure rules of stock exchanges force companies to unveil information whose secrecy may be crucial for their competitive advantage, such as data about ongoing R&D projects or future marketing strategies. They also expose them to close scrutiny from tax authorities, reducing their scope for tax elusion and evasion relative to private companies. Campbell (1979) was rst to point to con dentiality as a deterrent from getting funding in public markets. Yosha (1995) has shown that in equilibrium rms with more sensitive information are deterred from going public if the costs of a public o ering are su ciently high.
This would suggest a negative correlation between the R&D intensity of an industry and the probability of an IPO. Since we lack R&D data, we cannot test this hypothesis. But we shall examine the e ect of listing on corporate taxes as an alternative source of evidence on the role of con dentiality in the choice to go public.
The bene ts of going public 2.2.1 Overcoming borrowing constraints
Gaining access to a source of nance alternative to banks is probably the most cited bene t of going public, which is explicitly or implicitly present in most models. The opportunity to tap public markets for funds should be particularly appealing for companies with large current and future investments, high leverage, and high growth. All these factors should be positively related with the likelihood of an IPO. We measure current investment as capital expenditure 10 In Italy, the direct costs of an IPO are approximately 380 million Lire (administrative costs) plus 3.5 percent of the gross proceeds (underwriting fees). Source: Il Sole 24 Ore, Special Insert \Guida alla quotazione", 29 July 1994, p. 24, based on estimates of the Stock Exchange Council.
over property plant and equipment (CAPEX). As a proxy for future investment opportunities we use the median ratio of the market-to-book value of equity of public companies in the same industry (MTB). We measure leverage as the lagged value of total debt over total debt plus equity (LEVERAGE), and growth as the rate of growth in sales (GROWTH).
Other implications of the nancial constraint hypothesis, which can be tested using ex-post data, are: i) newly listed companies should increase their investment or reduce their debt exposure after the IPO; ii) they should not increase their payout ratio after the IPO.
Greater bargaining power with banks
Another potential problem with bank loans is that banks can extract rents from their privileged information about the credit worthiness of their customers. By gaining access to the stock market and disseminating information to the generality of investors, a company elicits outside competition to its lender and ensures a lower cost of credit, a larger supply of external nance or both, as highlighted by Rajan (1992) .
The prediction here is that companies facing higher interest rates and more concentrated credit sources are more likely to go public, and credit will become cheaper and more readily available after an IPO, controlling for pro tability and leverage. We measure the relative cost of credit to company i by RCC it = (1 + r it )=(1 + r t ), i.e. the ratio between the interest factor charged to company i at time t, 1 + r it , and the average interest factor, 1 + r t . 11 The concentration of the company's credit is measured by the Her ndahl index of the lines of credit granted to it by all banks (HERFINDAHL).
Liquidity and portfolio diversi cation
The decision to go public a ects the liquidity of a company's stock as well as the scope for diversi cation by the initial holders of the company. Shares of private companies can be traded only by informal searching for a counterpart, at considerable cost for the initiating party. Share trading on an organized exchange is cheaper, especially for small shareholders who want to trade on short notice. As a result, if the initial owners raise money from dispersed investors, they 11 A justi cation for this de nition is provided in section 4.2. factor in the liquidity bene t provided by being listed on an exchange. As shown by many market microstructure models, the liquidity of a company's shares is an increasing function of their trading volume, so that this liquidity bene t may be e ectively reaped only by su ciently large companies. This creates another reason to expect a positive relationship between size and the likelihood of an IPO. 12 Similarly, taking a company public provides to its owners opportunities for diversi cation. This can be achieved directly, by divesting from the company and reinvesting in other assets, or indirectly, by having the company raise fresh equity capital after the IPO and acquire stakes in other companies. If diversi cation is an important motive in the decision to go public, as in Pagano (1993), we should expect riskier companies to be more likely to go public, and controlling shareholders to sell a large portion of their shares at the time of the IPO or soon afterwards.
Monitoring
The stock market also provides a managerial discipline device, both by creating the danger of hostile takeovers and by exposing the market's assessment of managerial decisions. Moreover, the shareholders of a public company can use the information embodied in stock prices to design more e cient compensation schemes for their managers, for instance by indexing their salaries to the stock price or by o ering them stock options, as pointed out by Holmstr om and Tirole (1993). Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis because Italian companies do not disclose data on the structure of managerial compensation.
By contrast, Pagano and R oell (1996) argue that private companies owned by more than one shareholder may be over-monitored. If the scale of a planned expansion is very large, and thus needs to be nanced by many investors, the cost of this over-monitoring becomes so large that it is preferable to go public. So this model predicts a positive correlation between the probability of an IPO and the scale of the subsequent investment.
Investor recognition
It is well known that most investors hold portfolios which contain a small fraction of the existing securities, often because they simply ignore that a certain company exists. Listing on a major exchange can help to overcome this problem, by acting as an advertisement for the company. Merton (1987) has captured this point in a capital asset pricing model with incomplete information, showing that stock prices are higher the greater the number of investors aware of the company's securities.
This theory nds an indirect support in the fact that when companies already listed elsewhere announce their decision to list also in New York, their stock yields a 5 percent abnormal return on average (Kadlec and McConnell, 1994 ). We could not think, however, of a clean way to test this hypothesis with our data.
Change of control
In Zingales (1995a) the decision of a rm to go public is the result of a value maximizing decision made by an initial owner who wants to eventually sell his company. By going public, the initial owner can change the proportion of cash ow rights and control rights which he will retain when he bargains with a potential buyer. If the market for corporate control is not perfectly competitive, while the market for individual shares is, this proportion will a ect the total surplus he can extract from a potential buyer of the company. By selling cash ow rights to disperse shareholders and still retaining control, the incumbent succeeds in extracting the surplus which derives from the buyer's increased cash ow, avoiding the need to bargain over it with the buyer. However, by retaining control, the incumbent succeeds in extracting some of the surplus deriving from the buyer's larger private bene ts in a direct negotiation. So the initial owner uses the IPO as a step to achieve the structure of ownership in the company that will maximize his total proceeds from its eventual sale.
If this is an important motivation behind IPOs, we expect a high incidence of control transfers after listing.
Windows of opportunity
If there are periods in which stocks are mispriced, as suggested by Ritter (1991) , companies which realize that other companies in their industry are overvalued have an incentive to go public. 13 To the extent that entrepreneurs manage to exploit the overvaluation of their companies by investors, one would also expect a company to be more likely to go public when the market for comparable companies is particularly buoyant. We measure the buoyancy of the relevant market by the median market-to-book ratio of public companies in the same industry (MTB).
As noted above, however, a high market-to-book ratio may alternatively indicate that rational investors place a high valuation on the future growth opportunities in the industry. If these growth opportunities require large investments, companies will be induced to go public in order to raise the necessary funding.
We shall try to discriminate between these two hypotheses mainly by relying on ex post evidence: if new listed companies invest at an abnormal rate and earn large pro ts, then the relationship between market-to-book and IPOs is likely to be driven by expectations of future growth opportunities; otherwise, it is likely to re ect the desire to exploit a window of opportunity. But an indirect test can also be based on ex ante evidence: if raising funds for future investment is the main reason to go public, the likelihood of carve-outs should not be a ected by the marketto-book ratio, since in that case the parent company already has access to the stock market.
Analysis of the Ex Ante Determinants
The predictions derived in the previous section are of two types: predictions on the variables that should a ect the likelihood of an IPO and predictions on the likely consequences of an IPO. We follow the same distinction in testing them. In this section we estimate a probit model of the probability of going public, in the next section we study the e ects of this decision on performance, nancing, and cost of credit by comparing newly listed rms with similar rms that remained 13 This \window of opportunity" hypothesis, modelled and tested by Rajan and Servaes (1995) , is consistent with international time-series evidence in the 1980s (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994) . It is also consistent with the cross-sectional clustering of IPOs near sectorial stock price peaks (Ritter, 1984) and Lerner (1994) . It is also consistent with low long-run returns (Ritter, 1991, Loughran and Ritter, 1995) . private even though they met the listing requirements.
On the basis of the above discussion, we estimate the following model of the probability of going public: P r(IPO it = 1) = F ( 1 SIZE it + 2 CAPEX it + 3 GROWTH it + 4 ROA it + 5 LEVERAGE it + 6 MTB it + 7 RCC it + 8 HERFINDAHL it + t YEAR t );
where IPO it is a variable that equals 0 if company i stays private in period t and equals 1 if it goes public, F ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable, and YEAR t is a calendar year dummy. At any time t the sample includes all the private companies which in that year satisfy the listing requirements described in section 1.2. 14 Of course, after a company went public we drop it from the sample. We also exclude from the sample the Italian subsidiaries of foreign corporations (14% of the sample), because no such company has ever gone public in Italy. 15 The only explanatory variable that needs further discussion is pro tability, which we measure as the lagged return on assets (ROA: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization { hereafter EBITDA { over total assets). Pro tability may a ect the likelihood of an IPO in many di erent ways. First, pro ts are bound to be positively correlated with the likelihood of an IPO because of the e ect of the listing requirements (see section 1.2). To avoid the distortion induced by this sample selection, we restrict our estimates to company-years that satisfy the listing requirements. But, even after controlling for this sample selection problem, the predicted e ect of pro tability remains ambiguous. On the one hand, a more pro table company needs less external equity, suggesting a negative impact of pro tability on the probability of an IPO. On the other hand, a company experiencing a temporary surge in pro ts may list hoping that investors will mistakenly perceive its high pro tability as permanent and will overvalue its shares. In the latter case, one would expect pro tability to increase the probability of going public. 14 Before 1989 the listing requirements could be waived at discretion by the CONSOB and we have no way to tell which companies could have obtained a waiver from the CONSOB. In our sample only two companies list without satisfying the requirements. Our qualitative results do not change if we include all the companies in the estimation. 15 Anyway, including these companies does not materially a ect our estimates. Table 3 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of this probit model, as well as their standard errors. The rst column of table 3 reports the estimates obtained by pooling independent companies and subsidiaries of listed companies. In other words, we do not distinguish between the IPOs of independent companies and carve-outs.
Results on the entire sample
Not surprisingly, a company's size is an important determinant of an IPO. A one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of sales increases the probability of an IPO by one third of a percentage point. This corresponds to a 40% increase in the sample average probability of going public. This e ect is statistically signi cant at the 1% level.
Both the variables that measure a rm's nancing needs { i.e., investment and growth { increase the probability of listing, as expected. But the coe cient of investment is not statistically signi cant, while that of growth is only signi cant at the 10% level.
The proxies for the cost and availability of credit do not have much explanatory power either. Contrary to expectations, both the cost of bank credit and a rm's leverage have a negative impact on the likelihood of an IPO, but neither is statistically signi cant at the 10% level. By contrast, consistent with expectations, the concentration of bank credit appears to increase the likelihood of an IPO, but also this e ect is not statistically signi cant.
Even when we restrict the sample to companies eligible to go public, pro tability has a positive impact on the probability of going public, signi cant at the 10% level. A one standard deviation increase in pro tability increases the probability of going public by one tenth of a percentage point (roughly a 12% increase in the sample average probability of an IPO).
Finally, the industry market{to-book ratio appears to be the most signi cant determinant of the probability of listing, beside size. We nd that a one-standard deviation increase in the market-to-book ratio raises the probability of listing of a rm in the same sector by one fth of a percentage point, corresponding to a 25% increase in the sample average probability of going public. In our sample this translates into 16 more companies going public a year.
In 1984-86 new listings were given a temporary tax incentive in Italy. We analyze the e ect of this tax incentive by testing if, after controlling for other factors, IPOs are more likely in those three years. In the pooled sample, the probability of an IPO is 1.4 percentage points bigger in 1984-86 and this e ect is statistically signi cant at the 5% level. At face value, the impact of this tax incentive appears huge, especially if compared with the other estimated e ects. But we feel uncomfortable in attributing the entire e ect of these year dummies to the tax incentive, since they may be capturing a time clustering of IPOs such as those identi ed by Ritter (1984) . This alternative hypothesis is supported by the fact that the \hot market" also persists in 1987, despite the end of the tax incentive (the 1987 dummy is not signi cantly di erent from that of the preceding triennium).
One possible source of concern for the speci cation we adopted is that it ignores the possible existence of unobservable rm-speci c e ects, which might be correlated with our regressors. For example, practitioners talk about a \cultural resistance" of many entrepreneurs to take their companies public. If this entrepreneurial resistance is more widespread in more traditional businesses, which happen to be associated with low market-to-book value, then this cultural bias might account for the observed correlation between market-to-book and probability to go public. For this reason, we also estimated a linear probability model with rm-speci c e ects. The results (not reported) largely con rm our ndings. In particular, the industry market-to-book ratio and the company's size remain the two most important determinants of an IPO. We also estimated (not reported) a proportional hazard ratio model of the probability a private rm going public for the 11 years at our disposition. It remains the case that the industry market-to-book ratio and the company's size are the two most signi cant factors underlying the probability of an IPO, while the level of pro tability and the rate of growth lose statistical signi cance.
Di erences between independent IPOs and carve-outs
Further insights on the determinants of IPOs can be obtained by dividing the sample between independent IPOs and carve-outs. The factors underlying the decision of an independent company to go public are likely to di er from those driving the decision of a subsidiary of a public company. This hypothesis is supported by the data. A likelihood ratio test rejects at the 1% level the equality of the coe cients in the two subsamples.
The rst striking fact is that size does not matter for carve-outs. 16 The usual explanation for 16 One may suspect that the lack of statistical signi cance of size in the carve-out sample is due simply to all the the importance of size is that xed otation costs can be recovered only by rms above a certain threshold or, equivalently, that the liquidity bene ts of listing only accrue above a critical level of trading volume and capitalization. A possible reason why size matters only for independent companies is that for subsidiaries the xed costs of listing are partly sunk, being already borne by the parent company. This applies not only to the overhead costs of certi cation and dissemination of accounting information, but also to the implicit listing costs deriving from greater visibility to the tax and legal authorities. Another { possibly complementary { interpretation is that size acts as a proxy for reputation. As in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1995) , small independent companies nd it hard to become known to the investing public, and thus incur a large adverse selection cost in selling equity on public markets. In contrast, small subsidiaries of established public companies can exploit the reputation of their parent company.
A second di erence is that both the estimated e ects of pro tability and of the market-tobook ratio of traded rms in the same industry appear approximately 50% bigger for carve-outs than for independent companies, though the di erence is not statistically signi cant. Since these subsidiaries could already raise external equity via their parent company, the estimated e ect of the market-to-book ratio on the likelihood of carve-outs already lends some support to the window of opportunity hypothesis. A third di erence concerns the role of leverage. More indebted companies are more likely to list if they are independent, less if they are subsidiaries, but neither e ect is statistically signi cant.
A nal di erence regards investment and growth. Independent IPOs are companies that invested and grew more than the rest of the sample (both e ects are statistically signi cant). By contrast, carve-outs are subsidiaries that invested less than the rest and grew less (albeit this e ect is not statistically signi cant).
These ndings may help identify the di erent motives behind a carve-out and a normal IPO. Carve-outs are more reactive to a favorable market valuation in their particular sector. This decision will be taken, though, only if the company is in sound economic and nancial conditions. subsidiaries of public companies being above the minimum size required for listing. Their average size is indeed larger, but its range is not much di erent. To check that the di erent e ect of size in carve-outs is not merely due to a di erent size distribution, the regresison was re-estimated dropping smaller rms from the sample of independent companies: size remains a signi cant determinant.
This explains the higher coe cient of pro tability and MTB and the negative coe cient of leverage. An independent company may instead want to go public for need of equity capital, and this is more likely to be the case if the company is highly levered. The much stronger impact of the industry market-to-book value on the probability of a carve-out is due to the fact that a listed company is much better at timing the market than a closely held company. 17 The picture that emerges so far is that carve-outs are driven by nancial rather than real factors. This nding is consistent with evidence by Michaely and Shaw (1995) for the US. Public companies carve out their most pro table subsidiaries in industries that trade at a premium relative to their book value, irrespective of their size. By contrast, for independent companies, size is the most important determinant of the choice to go public and IPOs are more likely for high-growth rms which invested a lot.
Analysis of the Ex Post Consequences of an IPO
An alternative strategy for uncovering the determinants of the decision to go public is to compare the ex post performance of the companies which went public relative to otherwise identical rms that remained private. We investigate this by estimating xed-e ects regressions in which the e ect of the decision to go public is captured by dummy variables for the year of the IPO and the three subsequent years. In estimating these regressions we face two sample selection problems.
First, only the companies which meet the listing requirements can go public. The performance of newly-listed companies may di er from that of private companies simply because they had to meet a pro tability criterion before listing (for instance, their expected pro tability will be higher if pro ts are positively autocorrelated). To correct for this sample selection problem, our regressors must include variables which capture the e ect of meeting the listing requirements. To this purpose, we create four dummy variables, which at time t equal 1 only if a company met the listing requirement at times t, t ? 1, t ? 2 and t ? 3 respectively. This presupposes that the e ect of having met the listing requirement does not extend beyond three years.
Second, in estimating the ex-post consequences of IPOs, we face a potential endogenous selection problem: the companies which went public have chosen to do so. In principle this problem could be solved via a two-stage procedure, where the rst stage involves estimating a model of the decision to go public such as equation (1) estimated in the previous section. Unfortunately, the very limited explanatory power of equation (1) eliminates the practical relevance of this procedure. By using a xed e ect model we are using a rm before the IPO as a control for itself after the IPO. The table only reports the coe cients on the IPO and post-IPO dummy variables.
Accounting Measures of Performance
Before presenting the results, it is worthwhile to discuss an obvious objection to our speci cation. Changes in accounting measures of performance may not hinge only on the decision to go public but also on other variables: for instance, pro tability may depend also on lagged pro tability, sales, investment, and so on. To control for these other variables, we have also estimated richer reduced-form models where the list of regressors also includes lagged values of the dependent variable and of other accounting variables that might be relevant \a priori". Since in most cases the results of these richer dynamic models are found to be qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 , we do not report their estimates in a separate table, but we discuss them in what follows. We will make an exception only for the results on the cost of credit.
Pro tability
The rst row of the table shows that the pro tability declines after the IPO. The e ect increases gradually but steadily, rising from 1.5% less in the rst year after the IPO to 3% in the third year and in subsequent years. The fall in pro tability is statistically signi cant at the 1% level in each individual year. The permanent e ect is even stronger for carve-outs (-5%). This is consistent with the nding of Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1995). 18 As Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) point out, this result may be not all that surprising: entrepreneurs may time their issues to coincide with unusually high pro tability or they may engage in \window-dressing" of their corporate accounts at the time of the IPO. According to this view this result is simply due to a normal regression to the mean. We have already partly addressed this potential criticism by inserting dummies when a company satis ed the listing requirements in previous years. These dummies, which are all negative and highly statistically signi cant, suggest that only a third of the observed 3% drop in pro tability of IPOs can be explained by a normal regression to the mean.
We try to probe this issue deeper, by adding to the list of regressors the rst lag of pro tability and the pro tability in the year before the IPO. The rst lag of pro tability turns out to be very signi cant (with an estimated coe cient of .438 and a standard error of .14) but the coefcient of the pro tability in the year before the IPO is small and imprecisely estimated. In this speci cation, the impact coe cient of the IPO dummy decreases further to -.011 and becomes signi cant at the 5% level, and those of the post-IPO dummies remain negative and signi cant at conventional levels. The long-run impact of each dummy is approximately equal to the respective coe cient in the rst row of Table 4 . The same is true if the regressors also include lagged investment and the log of lagged sales, which both enter the regression with signi cant coecients. We conclude that the fall in pro tability is really associated with the IPO, and does not result only from regression to the mean or from the e ect of some other variable on pro tability. This post-IPO fall in pro tability, as well as the decline in investment for independent IPOs (see below), lend further support to the window of opportunity hypothesis. 18 The standard errors reported do not control for possible serial correlation. Following one of the referee's suggestions, we ran further regressions (not reported) to check whether our results depend on rst-order or second order serial correlation in the residuals. The results were substantially unchanged.
One possible explanation for this permanent drop in pro tability has to do with the accounting changes brought by the decision to go public. In preparing their accounts for the IPO, companies try to provide a fair (or even in ated) picture of the value of their assets, whereas private companies are more concerned about hiding their value from tax authorities. 19 As a result, the value of assets may be less undervalued (or more overvalued) in public companies than in private ones, correspondingly in ating the observed pro tability. 20 Other, more fundamental, explanations of the decline in pro tability, are based on adverse selection (companies go public when pro tability is about to decline permanently) or moral hazard (controlling shareholders have a greater incentive to extract private bene ts at the expense of minority shareholders). In both cases, the relevant models predict that the fall in pro tability will be larger for companies where the original owners retain less equity: in the adverse selection model of Leland and Pyle, lower equity retention is a signal of bad quality, and in the moral hazard model by Jensen and Meckling (1976) it heightens the agency problem.
We can distinguish between the accounting and the two more fundamental explanations for post-IPO performance by examining the e ect of the size of the incumbent's stake on a company's pro tability after the IPO. If the accounting explanation is right, then there should be no relationship between the two. By contrast, if either the moral hazard or the adverse selection explanations are correct, then we expect a negative relationship. Consistently with the second hypothesis, in an unreported regression we nd that the post-IPO decline in pro tability is negatively related to the fraction of the company sold at the IPO. 21 
Investment and leverage
Surprisingly, for independent companies the decision to go public has a negative impact on capital expenditures, as shown in the second row of Table 4 . The decline in investment becomes signi cant only two years after the IPO but is large and permanent (a 7% reduction of the capital stock). 19 The same reason, though, suggests that private companies are more likely to under-report pro ts, biasing the results against our nding.
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This problem might be particularly severe in Italy, where the high in ation rate of the 1970s and early 1980s distorted the valuation of assets based on historical cost and where scal authorities periodically concede tax bene ts to companies that voluntarily step up the book value of assets. 21 The interested reader can nd a more detailed exposition of this test in the working paper version of this paper, Pagano et al. (1995) .
In contrast, carve-outs exhibit a signi cant temporary increase in investment at the time of the IPO (6% of the capital stock). These estimated e ects persist when the regressors also include current pro tability, external debt, external equity, and lagged investment, sales and pro tability (all of which have positive and signi cant coe cients, except for lagged investment and sales).
Independent companies and carve-outs also di er markedly in the change of their leverage after the IPO, as illustrated by the third row of the table. Independent companies deleverage immediately, substantially (between 5% and 7% in the rst four years) and permanently (by 9%), while carve-outs do so only in the long run (also by 9%). One may suspect that the nding that independent IPOs reduce their leverage after going public derives from their high pro tability before the IPO (recall that there is a strong negative correlation between leverage and pro tability, see for example Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . But the result persists when one controls for lagged leverage, for current and lagged pro tability (all highly signi cant) and for pro tability in the year before the IPO (not signi cant).
If we consider these results together with those arising from our ex-ante analysis in section 3, a consistent story emerges. Recall that before the IPO, independent companies tend to display abnormally high investment and growth, while carve-outs have abnormally low investment and leverage. The ex-post evidence adds that after the IPO independent companies reduce their leverage and { with a lag { investment, while carve-outs step up investment temporarily at the time of the IPO and reduce leverage only later on. So independent companies tend to go public to rebalance their capital structure after implementing substantial investment plans, while carveouts occur to raise resources to nance current investment and, as we shall see later, to allow the controlling shareholder to divest partly from the company.
Other accounting variables
The results concerning the other accounting variables in Table 4 are less striking. Investment in nancial assets rises temporarily at the time of the IPO, probably because the new public companies \park" temporarily the abnormal in ow of liquidity from the IPO in nancial assets. Moreover, as one would expect, equity nancing rises sharply (by 6%) in the year of the IPO. There is no signi cant change in debt nancing, payout and growth. The result about growth is at odds with the prototype of the IPO as a means to nance corporate growth, but squares with the above-reported results about investment (at least for the independent companies).
An interesting result is that new public companies appear to be subject to a permanent increase in tax pressure after the IPO: as a fraction of their operating income, they pay about 2% more taxes per year than before, although the e ect is imprecisely estimated. This provides some basis for the argument that the greater accounting transparency associated with listing prevents companies from eluding or evading taxes, and that this represents one of the costs of going public. 22 
Cost of credit
One of the often claimed advantages of going public (Basile, 1988) is that access to security markets may improve the rm's bargaining position with banks, as pointed out by Rajan (1992) . This hypothesis can be tested using our data on the rates o ered by the largest 79 Italian banks to their clients.
In measuring changes in the cost of credit we face two problems. First, we need to de ne properly what we mean with a change in the relative cost of credit during a period when the level of bank rates was extremely variable (the average rate oscillated between 12.95 and 22.76 percent). We chose to de ne the relative cost of credit of rm i with respect to the average cost of credit as the ratio between the interest factor charged to company i at time t (1 + r it ) divided by the average interest factor charged to all the companies in the sample at that time (1 + r t ). 23 The appealing feature of this de nition is that it is invariant to changes in the general level of interest rates. We also use (in unreported regressions) the di erence between a rm's rate and the average rate as a measure of the relative cost of credit and we obtain results that are economically and statistically similar.
A second issue regards which interest rate should we use, given that all companies have a 22 We nd another piece of evidence in favor of the view that tighter accounting standards entail greater tax pressure: if the regression is re-estimated after adding a dummy for Italian subsidiaries of foreign companies, which are presumably forced by their parent company to keep to strict accounting rules, one nds that these companies pay 2% more taxes than domestic companies. 23 This is the appropriate de nition in a risk neutral world where di erences in loan rates are solely determined by default risk. For instance, if company i has a probability i to default (and when defaults it does not pay anything back), then 1 + rit equals 1+r ft 1? i , where rft is the risk free rate at time t. credit relationship with several banks. We chose to use the median rate charged to rm i at time t (de ned as the last quarter of the year), because of its robustness to reporting errors. 24 We have also tried a weighted average of the rates charged to each rm by its banks on all the outstanding credit lines, without signi cant changes in the results.
The estimates reported in Table 4 indicate a drop in the relative cost of credit of IPOs. This e ect is statistically and economically signi cant in the IPO year and in the three subsequent years, while it weakens afterwards. The e ect appears to be entirely concentrated among independent IPOs. For these rms, we can reject the hypothesis that there are no changes in the cost of credit after an IPO at the 1% level, while we cannot reject it for carve-outs.
The observed drop corresponds to a reduction in the rate of between 40 and 70 basis points. 25 Considering that the average IPO has debt equal to Lire 99 billion (US$ 64.3 M), this reduction, if it applies to all debt, would produce Lire 495 million (US$ 321,000) of savings per year. If permanent, this would imply a present value of savings of 3.1 billion Lire (US$ 2 M) { a sum larger than the direct costs of going public. 26 There are at least three (possibly complementary) reasons why rates may fall after an IPO. First, upon listing companies may become safer borrowers because they reduce their leverage, as shown by Table 4 . Second, more information becomes publicly available about them, so that lenders spend less to collect information about their credit worthiness. Since by its very nature this information cannot be appropriated by any lender, banking competition will ensure that the lower information costs are rebated to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates. Third, being listed on the stock market o ers to the company an outside nancing option that curtails the bargaining power of banks as in Rajan (1992) .
In Table 5 we analyze the post-IPO changes in the cost of credit while controlling for the changes in the fundamental risk characteristics of a company. As proxies for risk we use a 24 The raw data report the quarterly payment (interest plus xed fees) made by a rm to the bank and its quarterly average balance. Of course, using this data to compute the average interest rate will overestimate the rate of bank with a small average balance. For this reason, we eliminated the rates referring to credit lines with less than 50 million Lire (US$ 32,500) in average daily balance. 25 This is obtained by multiplying the coe cients (ranging between 0.0035 to 0.0062) by 1 plus the average bank rate during the period (0.16). 26 As explained earlier, in Italy, the direct costs of going public equal approximately US$ 250,000 plus 3.5 percent of the gross proceeds, so that an IPO worth 50 billion Lire costs about 2.13 billion Lire, that is, 4.3 percent of the gross proceeds.
company's size, its leverage, and its pro tability. 27 The estimated drop in the rates is only marginally reduced in this more complete speci cation. It remains true that independent IPOs exhibit an economically and statistically signi cant drop (30-55 basis points) in their cost of credit in the IPO year and in the three years afterward. The e ect is weaker (25 basis points) and imprecisely estimated after the third year following an IPO and is absent for carve-outs.
Overall, Table 5 suggests that the drop in the cost of credit should not simply be attributed to an improvement in the credit worthiness of newly listed rms. Although we cannot exclude that an unobservable improvement in credit quality (not captured by our regressors) causes the drop, we regard this possibility as unlikely.
To support this view there are also the data on the concentration of credit (measured as the Her ndahl index of the lines of credit granted to a company by all its banks) and the number of banks with an outstanding line of credit toward an IPO rm. As the last two rows of Table 4 indicate, independent IPOs experience a reduction in the concentration of credit and an increase in the number of banks. The second e ect is common to both subsamples, but is larger and statistically signi cant only for independent IPOs; the rst one is present only in independent IPOs. Moreover, this e ect appears mostly concentrated in the rst three years after the IPO, along with the reduction in rates.
In sum, these results suggest that there is more occurring around the IPO than a simple change in the credit quality of newly listed rms. At this stage, however, it is not possible to distinguish between the two other explanations { information and bargaining.
Ownership and control
The change in the structure of ownership and in the controlling shareholder can o er important insights into the motives to go public. In particular, if the IPO is accompanied or followed by substantial divestment by the controlling shareholders or by surrender of control to outsiders, the likely motivation of the IPO is to allow the controlling shareholders to diversify their portfolio or increase consumption, rather than to tap fresh sources of nance for company investment. Table 6 reports ownership changes for the IPOs in our sample. The gures in the rst row show that the median percentage stake of voting rights held by the controlling group falls by 30 points at the time of the IPO and by 5 more points in the three subsequent years (23 and 2 percent respectively if one looks at mean values). The initial owners, though, still retain a stake much larger than the one that would ensure their control (i.e., 50 percent). The stake retained by the controlling shareholders is larger than what Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1995) nd in the US (44 percent) and Brennan and Franks (1996) nd for Britain (35 percent).
Changes in ownership and control around the IPO date
To determine if controlling shareholders have on balance divested from the company, however, we need to factor in the amount of capital raised at the IPO and in the three subsequent years. This is accomplished in the second and third rows. Since there are no reporting requirements for nonvoting shares, we can only approximate the exact fraction of cash ow rights retained by controlling shareholders. The gures in the second row are obtained assuming that controlling shareholders underwrite pro quota any new equity issue of nonvoting shares. By contrast, the third row assumes that they do not buy any newly issued non voting stock. The results are substantially the same under the two assumptions, and they indicate that controlling shareholders divest very little of their holdings in the company at the IPO (-3.2 percent) and they even slightly increase their holdings in the three subsequent years (+0.2 percent).
These two facts combined suggest that controlling shareholders do not seem to plan the IPO to diversify their equity holdings. This seems to rule out the diversi cation motive. But the reduction of the riskiness of the controlling group's holdings may still be an important determinant of IPOs, since newly listed companies signi cantly decrease their leverage with the funds raised at the IPO.
But these descriptive statistics conceal who is doing what: the data reveal that in 40.6 percent of the cases the company raises new equity and the control group does not sell its equity at the time of the IPO, and in another 40.6 percent the company does not raise new equity and the control group sells some equity. Only in 11.6 percent of the cases does the company issue new equity while the control group decumulates. 28 In fact, the correlation between the issue of new equity and the reduction of the control group's stake is -0.35, and is signi cant at the 1 percent con dence level. So there are two quite distinct groups of companies in the sample: those where the control group keeps a strong nancial commitment and demands new funds from outside investors, and those where it divests and does not raise new equity.
The fourth row of Table 6 shows the amount of new equity raised through issues of voting shares, while the fth row shows the total amount of new equity issues. Newly quoted companies raise a substantial amount of fresh equity capital, mostly at the time of the IPO (7.2 percent of their market value for the median company).
The sixth row indicates that the number of shareholders increases by over 1,000 times if one looks at median values. What is surprising is the substantial reduction in the number of shareholders in the subsequent three years (over 1/3 of the shareholders exit). This appears to be a special feature of the Italian market. 29 In the three years after the IPO, the control group sells out the controlling stake to an outsider in 13.6 percent of the cases (bottom row). This gure shows that the turnover of control in newly quoted companies is about twice as high as in the Italian economy at large: the probability of a change in control over an horizon of three years is estimated to have been 7 percent in 1980-83 and 5.5 percent in 1986-90, employing a sample of 973 manufacturing rms used in the study by Barca et al. (1995) . 30 A chi-square test rejects at the 1% level the hypothesis that in privately held companies control is as likely to change hands as in new IPOs. This suggests that going public makes a change in control much more likely than it is for private companies. This may re ect the greater ease of transferring control on a public company or the greater incidence of control transfers associated with bad performance of the company (recall that our IPOs feature substandard pro tability). An alternative explanation is that listing is chosen by controlling 28 In 28 cases the control group sells equity and the company does not issue new equity. In another 28 cases the control group does not sell equity and the company issues new equity. In 5 cases the control group sells equity while the company issues new equity, while in 6 companies neither event happens. 29 Since we were not aware of any study on this issue for other countries, we undertook an exploratory analysis of what happens in the US. We looked at the rst ten rm-commitment IPOs in 1985. In all cases but one, three years after the IPO the number of shareholders had increased (median increase: 158 percent). 30 Riccardo Cesari, one of the authors of that study, has kindly estimated this probability at our request, using the INVIND sample, which is well representative of the Italian manufacturing sector and contains a negligible number of public companies (34 out of 973).
shareholders who want to sell out. This is consistent with Zingales (1995a) , who sees the transfer of control as a key factor underlying the decision to go public. Table 6 also distinguishes between independent IPOs and carve-outs. The signi cant di erences are that in independent companies (i) the control group starts out with a lower percentage stake than in carve-outs, (ii) controlling shareholders are less likely to divest at the time of the IPO (42 percent of the companies against 63 percent for carve-outs) and divests on average less (6 percent of the value of the company, to be compared with 14 percent for carve-outs), and (iii) controlling shareholders surrender control to outsiders less frequently (in only 10.5 percent of the cases versus 17.9 percent for carve-outs). So divestment and reallocation of control play a much more important role in the decision to carve out a subsidiary than in the decision to list an independent company. This is consistent with the view that public holding companies act more strategically in their decision to list their subsidiaries than independent private companies in their choice to go public: public holding companies appear to list their pro table, low-debt subsidiaries with superior market timing, and they often do this before transferring ownership and control over the subsidiary to a third party.
Discussion and Conclusions
As it is well known (e.g. Pagano 1993), the Italian stock market is very small relative to the size of its economy. The limited number of IPOs in the last decade con rms this peculiarity. One may then wonder to what extent our results can be generalized outside this country. In this section we try to address this question while reviewing our main results.
To start with, it is important to realize that even though the Italian case appears as a weird anomaly compared to the United States, it is far from unique in the European context. Rather, it typi es in an extreme form the di erences between the stock markets of Continental Europe and those of Anglo-Saxon countries, both in terms of market capitalization and in term of number of IPOs. This suggests that some of our qualitative results on the motivations of IPOs and the role of the stock market in Italy may extend to other European equity markets. As we shall see below, there is some evidence pointing in this direction.
Our rst nding is that the probability of an IPO is positively a ected by the stock market valuation of rms in the same industry. This result is neither surprising nor unique to our sample. The clustering of IPOs is a well established regularity both in the US (Ritter, 1984) and other countries (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1993, and Ljungqvist, 1995) . But our approach allows us to distinguish whether this positive relationship re ects a higher investment need in sectors with good growth opportunities (and correspondingly high market-to-book ratio) or the owners' attempt to exploit sectorial mispricing. Since in the Italian case investment and pro tability decrease after IPOs, the explanation based on mispricing appears more appropriate. Second, we nd that a company's size is signi cantly correlated with the probability of listing. Again, this result is not so surprising. What is more surprising is how large an Italian company must be before it considers going public. The typical Italian IPO is 8 times as large and 6 times as old as the typical IPO in the US. Since the xed component of the direct listing costs does not di er signi cantly, this raises the question of why in Italy rms need such a long track record before going public. One possible argument is that Italian companies need a higher reputational capital to go public because the lack of enforcement of minority property rights in that country makes the magnitude of the potential agency problem much bigger. This is consistent with independent evidence that Italian companies can more easily dilute the value of minority shareholdings and with the much larger value of control compared to the US (Zingales, 1994 (Zingales, , 1995b . That size may act as a proxy of reputation in our data also squares with the fact that it does not a ect the likelihood of carve-outs: subsidiaries of publicly listed companies can presumably draw upon the reputational capital of their parent company.
An alternative explanation of this nding turns on another { often ignored { xed costs of listing, as the implicit costs of a higher visibility to the tax and legal authorities. As the Financial Times puts it, \In Italy it is common knowledge most companies keep two sets of books and that tax evasion is widespread." (December 30, 1994, p. 4) . Upon listing, a company must have its accounts certi ed externally, which increases the cost of keeping a parallel accounting system. Smaller independent rms may nd it prohibitively expensive to set up such systems and so avoid tapping public equity markets. Under this explanation, the likelihood of carve-outs is una ected by size because in their case the \visibility cost" is already borne by the parent company.
But the lack of young-company IPOs cannot be explained only by features speci c to Italy:
the average age of rms going public in Continental Europe is 40 years (Rydqvist and H ogholm, 1995) , in contrast with the US where many startup companies go public to nance their expansion. This leads us to our third nding, that is, the contribution of the stock market to investment and growth, where another striking similarity emerges between our results and the evidence for other European countries { and a related contrast with the US. We nd that companies do not go public to nance subsequent investment and growth, but rather to rebalance their accounts after a period of high investment and growth. IPOs do not appear to nance subsequent investment and growth also in Spain (see Planell, 1995) and in Sweden (see Rydqvist and H ogholm, 1995) . In contrast, in the US newly listed companies feature phenomenal growth (see Mikkelson, Partch and Shah, 1995) . Again, this di erence may re ect the more mature age of European IPOs: Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1995) nd that also in the US older rms are more likely to use the funds raised to pay down debt than to nance growth.
Fourthly, our evidence indicates that going public provides a bene t not uncovered in previous studies: it enables companies to borrow more cheaply. Around the IPO date the interest rate on their short-term credit falls and the number of banks willing to lend to them rises. It is an open question how widely this result generalizes to other countries. 31 Finally, our data reveal that IPOs are followed by an abnormally high turnover in control. This occurs even though the controlling group always retains a large controlling block after the IPO. This nding is consistent with Zingales' (1995a) argument that IPOs are undertaken to maximize the incumbent's proceeds from an eventual sale of the company. This is not necessarily unique to Italy: in the Swedish data analyzed by Rydqvist and H ogholm (1995) the eventual of surrender of control over the company emerges as a key motivation of IPOs.
One important question this study raises and that only future research will be able to address is why in Continental European countries the stock market mainly caters to large, mature companies with little need to nance investment, while the opposite is true of the US. Does this re ect the ability of small companies to nd other, more e cient channels to nance their investments or rather the inability of small companies to access public equity markets, possibly because of the reasons mentioned above for Italy? 31 Planell (1995) nds some evidence that newly listed Spanish companies face a comparatively high cost of credit before the IPO, but enjoy no signi cant decrease in interest rates after the IPO. 
Summary Statistics
In panel A the summary statistics refer to the entire sample, in panel B to the company-years that satisfy the o cial requirements for listing as of that year, in Panel C to the companies which went public between 1982 and 1992, as of the year of their IPO. Note that the listing requirements changed during the sample period (see text). In panel C we lose three observations because the IPO-year contains some outliers (2 observations) and because the information for that company-year is not available from our dataset (1 observation). Panel D reports the age since incorporation of IPOs and its di erence with respect to a matching company, de ned as the closest company in size (net sales) which belongs to the same industry. ROA is EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) over total assets at the end of the previous year. ROS is EBITDA over revenues. Leverage is book value of short plus long term debt divided by book value of short plus long term debt plus book value of equity. Coverage is EBITDA divided by interest expenses (values above 100 are truncated at 100, values below zero are truncated at zero). Taxes are taxes paid divided by operating income. The MTB is the median market to book value of equity of rms in the same industry which traded on the Milan Stock Exchange. Capex are capital expenditures over end of the year net property plant and equipment. Investment are nancial investment divided by total assets. Equity nancing is the equity issued divided by total capital (total debt plus equity). Debt nancing are debt issues divided by total capital. Payout is dividend paid divided by net income plus depreciation. The loan rate is the median interest rate paid by a rm on its lines of credit outstanding. Determinants of the Decision to Go Public
The e ect of the variables listed on the probability to go public is estimated by a probit model. The estimation method is maximum likelihood. The dependent variable is 0 if the company is not listed and 1 on the year of listing (observation for public companies are dropped from the sample). The sample is restricted to all companiesyears which satisfy the listing requirement as of that year. Subsidaries of foreign corporations are excluded from the sample. The independent-IPO sample excludes all subsidiaries of publicly traded companies from the sample, while the carve-out sample is restricted to subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. Sales is the lagged value of the logarithm of revenues. Capex is the lagged value of capital expenditures over Property Plant and Equipment. Growth is the rate of growth of sales in that year. ROA is the lagged value of EBITDA over total assets. Leverage is the lagged value of the ratio of the book value of short plus long term debt divided by book value of short plus long term debt plus book value of equity the year before. Bank rate is the lagged value of the relative cost of borrowing for rm i relative to the average borrowing rate of all the rms in the sample. The concentration of borrowing is the lagged value of the Her ndahl index of the lines of credit granted by di erent banks. The industry MTB is the median market to book value of equity of rms in the same industry which traded on the Milan Stock Exchange. The regression includes also a constant term and calendar year dummies (not reported). Standard errors are in brackets. The tax e ect is the average value of the calendar year dummies in the three years when there was a tax incentive to go public. The p-value of an F-test for the hypothesis that the joint e ect of these three variables equals zero is also reported. indicates the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less; indicates the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 5% level; indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level where ui and dt are respectively a rm-speci c and calendar year speci c e ect, IPOt?j are dummy variables equal to one if year t ? j was the IPO year, IPOt?n is a dummy variable equal to one if IPO took place more than 3 years before, and QUOTt?j are dummy variables equal to one if year company i satis ed the listing requirements in year t ? j. By using a xed e ect model we are using each company before the IPO as a control for itself after the IPO. The table only reports the coe cients on the IPO and post-IPO dummy variables. The independent sample excludes subsidiaries of publicly traded companies, while the carve-out sample is restricted to subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. The number of observations is reported below the de nition of each sample and may vary slightly because of data availability. ROA is EBITDA over total assets at the end of the previous year. Capex are capital expenditures over property plant and equipment. Financial investment is divided by total assets. Leverage is book value of short plus long term debt divided by book value of short plus long term debt plus book value of equity. Equity nancing is the equity issued divided by total capital (total debt plus equity). Debt nancing are debt issues divided by total capital. Payout is dividend paid divided by net income plus depreciation. Taxes are taxes paid divided by operating income. Growth is the rate of growth of sales in that year. Interest rate is the relative cost of credit of rm i measured as one plus the median rate paid on all the outstanding credit lines divided by one plus the average rate paid by all rms in the sample during that year. The concentration of credit is the Her ndahl index of the credit lines outstanding. The number of banks is the number of banks with a credit line outstanding. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The the last column reports the p-value of an F-test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coe cients of all the post-IPO dummies are equal to zero. The superscript indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 5% level or less; the superscript indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level. The E ect of an IPO on Bank Rates
We estimate the e ect of an IPO on the cost of credit with a within estimator. The cost of credit is de ned as 1+r it 1+ rt , where rit is the median rate across all banks paid by rm i in year t and rt is the cross sectional average of rates charged to the rms in the sample in year t. A separate dummy is inserted in the IPO year and the following three years. We then have a dummy which equals 1 in all the rm-years following the third year after the IPO, and 0 otherwise. We control for the selection bias generated by the listing requirements by inserting four analogous dummies (not reported) if a company satis ed the listing requirements respectively that year, the year before, two years before, and three years before. We also insert calendar year dummies (not reported). Besides these dummies we include as a regressors the level of pro tability (ROA is EBITDA over total assets), leverage (book value of short plus long term debt divided by book value of short plus long term debt plus book value of equity) and the company's size (logarithm of sales). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
Whole sample Independent Carve-outs indicates the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 1% level or less; indicates the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 5% level; indicates that the coe cient is signi cantly di erent from zero at the 10% level Changes in the Ownership Structure This table reports the changes in the ownership structure at the time of the IPO and in the three subsequent years. The time of the IPO is de ned as the end of the year in which the company became listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. The holdings of the control group is the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder, by members of his/her family and any other holder who signed a binding voting trust with him/her, provided this trust is mentioned in the prospectus. The purchase (sale) of equities is the fraction of total market value of equity bought (sold) by the control group at the IPO. The purchase (sale) of equities in the following three years is the fraction of total market value of equity (as measured at the IPO) bought (sold) by the control group, where sales and purchases are computed at the IPO price (this gure is meant to capture the e ective fraction divested, independent of the price at which it is divested). The gures regarding common stock are based on the assumption that the control group underwrites nonvoting equity issues pro quota. The gures regarding voting stock are based on the assumption that the control group does not underwrite any nonvoting equity issue. Issues of voting and nonvoting shares is the amount of capital raised respectively through the issue of voting and nonvoting stock as a fraction of the market capitalization at the IPO in the 6 months before and after the IPO. (Saving shares that are convertible into voting shares are treated as voting shares.) The turnover in control is de ned as the change in the identity of the major shareholder. The numbers reported are respectively the median, the mean and the standard deviation (in brackets). Signi cantly di erent from zero at the 1% level. 1 Signi cantly di erent from the value before the IPO at the 1% level. 2 Signi cantly di erent from the value at the IPO at the 1% level.
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